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Letter dated 28 June 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Counter-Terrorism Committee has received the attached addendum to the report from Georgia submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could arranged for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jeremy **Greenstock**
Chairman
Counter-Terrorism Committee

02-47142 (E) 170702

Annex

Letter dated 20 June 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

I have the honour to transmit herewith information additional to the report submitted by Georgia pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001), signed by the Chairman of the Interagency National Counter-Terrorism Commission, Mr. Jemal Gakhokidze (see enclosures I and II).

(*Signed*) G. **Volski**
Chargé d'affaires

Enclosure I

Proposals for early detection and advance modeling of the terrorism threats with a view of guaranteeing the security of the Eurasia Corridor

We would like to offer the draft program for the consideration and for further generalization in the case of its feasibility: "The Program for Early Detection and Advance Modeling of the Terrorism Threats with a View of Guaranteeing the Security of the Eurasia Corridor". In our opinion, the commencement of the implementation of the mentioned program would, no doubt, enhance the stabilization of the Eurasia Corridor, its timely safeguarding against terrorism threats. Such kind of advanced modeling of terrorism threats would enable us to implement the most efficient and advantageous measures for the prevention of the acts of terrorism. It would make easier the process of adopting correct organizational and structural decisions for the discharge of this function.

Let us first of all consider the pressing nature of this problem:

The most essential strategic goal of Georgia is to build up an independent, democratic and peaceful state, which would be capable to play an important part on the crossroads of Europe and Asia in the field of development and reinforcement of multilateral relations between the East and the West, the North and the South.

Full-scale performance of the Eurasia Corridor is of particular importance for the attainment of this strategic goal, as far as it opens up the actual opportunities for Georgia to fully discharge its geopolitical functions and to obtain the international guarantees for the state independence. In this respect the importance of the Eurasia Corridor for Georgia goes far beyond the economic implication. Actually, it acquires the political, economic, geopolitical and international significance for the establishment of the new world order and civilized system in the region and particularly in Georgia.

Thus, in our mind, guaranteeing the security or the mentioned Corridor is one of the most important tasks of not only Georgia, but of the whole regional and international community as well.

We would also like to add, that the protection of the Corridor goes beyond the military aspects. Political, social, ethnic, criminogenic and a range of other problems, sometimes atypical ones, which might become the main aspect of a threat, frequently entail complicated and global processes in this region. The controversial geopolitical processes of our region moreover emphasize the urgency of the development of the measures for the early detection of such threats and their prevention.

Proceeding from the above said, we consider the preventive modeling of the measures necessary for the early detection of the threats and their avoidance as one of the essential preconditions for guarantying the security of the Eurasia Corridor (meaning the basic military and non-military internal and external hazards).

At the same time, with due consideration of the importance of the problem, we consider that such an analytical and predictive system should be elaborated and enacted within the framework of the National Security Council of Georgia.

The Goal of the Project. The main purpose is the promotion of security of the Corridor through the implementation of the system of early detection and preventive modeling of the threats throughout the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor.

The main tasks of the project are to be the following:

- Establishment of the political background of the threats;
- Establishment of the social background of the threats;
- Establishment of the ethno-political nature of a threat;
- Classification of the potential threats on the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor;
- Drafting of the demographic, topographic, criminogenic, communication and other maps for the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor;
- Establishment of the monitoring system on the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor;
- Elaboration of the comparative analytical systems for the acts of terrorism already committed on the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor;
- Creation of the legal and confidential databases concerning the terrorists and the terrorist organizations located close to the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor;
- Establishment of the monitoring systems in the major points of the Corridor crossing Georgia;
- Monitoring of the terrorist environment;
- Modeling of the measures for the early detection of the threats and their counterbalancing.

Anticipated major outcomes:

The implementation of the major tasks of the project would enable us to use the following to secure the stability of the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor:

- Technologically and intellectually advanced databases;
- Rational and the most advantageous system of obtaining, processing and systematization of the analytical-predictive information for the prevention of the threats;
- Advanced methodological framework for the elaboration of the identification and the early detection of the threats and preventive measures;
- Threat modeling Computer programs;
- Counter terrorism systematic programs;
- Security schemes and maps of the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor.

The structure and potential of the Project implementation:

- The overall management of the Project implementation shall be vested with the National Security Council of Georgia;

- Direct executors of Project shall be the personnel of the National Security Council of Georgia and the independent analytical centers chosen according to the specific nature of the set tasks;

- Georgian and foreign scientists, specialists and experts should as well participate in the implementation of the Project.

Anticipated period for the implementation of the Project: 3-4 years.

It is not difficult or debatable to ascertain, that the elaboration of a similar program, based on a regional principle for such countries, as they are Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey. The main purpose of this program should be the guaranteeing the regional security of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline. At the next stages the countries of Central Asia should as well be involved in the implementation of such a program. Naturally when speaking about the security, we mainly mean the menace of terrorism, despite the broad meaning of this term.

To sum up, we would like to say, that the elaboration of the counter terrorism programs based on this principle even at a global level is not only expedient, but absolutely necessary as well.

(*Signed*) Jemal **Gakhokidze**
Chairman of the Interagency
National Counter-Terrorism Commission
Deputy Secretary of the
National Security Council of Georgia
Candidate of Legal Sciences

Enclosure II

Proposal for resolving the problems of nuclear materials located on the territory of Abkhazia

I have the honor to forward to you addendum to the Report submitted by Georgia pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001).

As we have already informed the Security Council antiterrorist Committee in the aftermath of September 11th terrorist attacks the National Security of Georgia established an Interagency Counter-terrorism Commission to address threats of terrorism, to coordinate country's efforts as of a member of International Antiterrorist Coalition of States and to ensure full implementation of Georgia of the UN Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and its national program of fighting against terrorism.

It is in this context we are particularly alarmed by the threats of nuclear terrorism given the possibility of smuggling the nuclear materials and presence of multiple radioactive sources in the country. Unequipped for detecting nuclear materials and porous borders, pockets of endemic lawlessness and violence in the zone of conflicts turns into "safe haven" for criminals, make likelihood of falling the nuclear materials into possession of terrorist-fundamentalists real. For more than 197 unaccounted sources of radiation have been found in Georgia since 1995, mainly left by the Soviet, then Russian Army, the data of their location held by Russia is mostly classified making them dangerous for the Georgian population and easily accessible for potential terrorists.

Interception of 3 kg of enriched of Uranium-235 in 2000 by the Antiterrorist Center of the Ministry of State Security points at growing magnitude of the problem. All the more in this situation the Government of Georgia has all grounds to be concerned by the problem of radioactive sources located in the zone of conflict, namely in the Sukhumi Physical and Technical Institute (SPTI, former Soviet nuclear research institute) and the military base of Russian Federation in Gudauta.

The Government of Georgia sought assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency in assessing the nuclear situation in Abkhazia and working out safely and security arrangements for these radioactive materials.

In 28-29 September 2002, the UN facilitated the meeting of the Georgian and Abkhaz side together with their Russian counterparts in Sukhumi under the aegis of the IAEA to discuss the problem of safety storage of the radioactive materials, the experts evaluated the state of the Institute's storing facility as disastrous but diverged in proposing long-term solution of the problem. The representatives of the Ministry of Atomic Energy backed by the Abkhaz side insisted on building a new nuclear material storage in the mountainous regions of Abkhazia and expresses readiness to allocate 6 million US dollars for this purpose.

Implementation of proposal of the ministry of Atomic Energy itself would inevitably raise numerous, very serious concerns casting doubt on its plausibility. First and foremost the Government of Georgia and IAEA have been negotiating the construction of secure, nuclear waste storage site in Eastern Georgia so that there is no building another facility in the volatile territory controlled by the Abkhaz separatist regime and thus beyond the reach of the Government of Georgia. The danger of falling the radioactive materials into the possession of the terrorists may

considerably increase would Russian Federation still objecting to international verification of the closure of the Gudauta military base decide to transfer the radioactive materials from the base to the new storage site in Abkhazia.

In a wider, regional prospective, the region of Abkhazia may well be used as an outpost for smuggling nuclear materials both stored and smuggled into Georgia from outside to Europe. The situation exacerbated by the fact that the Azerbaidjani-Georgian border is nor equipped with the means of detection so that remains porous for nuclear materials. Illegal transportation of radioactive materials can not be excluded through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Osetia sections of the Russian-Georgian border, where Russia unilaterally established the simplified visa regime for the separatist regions.

In May 2001, by invitation of the Government of Georgia the mission of the IAEA visited Sukhumi. After the mission extensively studied the nuclear safety situation in the SPTI the IAEA decided to include into its agenda the item on necessity of construction of the site for nuclear material storage in Eastern Georgia.

The Government of Georgia brought the issue of safety of nuclear materials into the agenda of Coordinating council (organ of the UN-led peace process in Abkhazia, Georgia, composed of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides to the conflict and the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General, namely France, United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Russia). Consequently the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed Resolution of Working Group III Regarding Radioactive Waste on the Territory of Sukhumi Physical Institute (SPTI) and other Organizations (see annex).

The Resolution sets out a framework for cooperation that entail inter alia creation of roster of radioactive sources and waste and provides for temporary safety measures until the permanent storage area for these radioactive substances is arranged. Notwithstanding modest objectives of the Resolution the technical and financial assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency remains crucial for its implementation.

Given aforesaid Government of Georgia deems necessary to register need for assistance in the following:

- assistance in providing the Border Guard and Customs of Georgia with the equipment for detecting the radioactive agents and training;
- assistance in providing additional safeguards for safety of nuclear reactor in Mtskheta through installing security equipment (surveillance video cameras, sensor alarms etc.);
- assistance in equipping and training the Georgian Navy and the Border Guard with the means of monitoring of radiation in the Black Sea Basin;
- assistance in negotiating with Russia release of the data on location of radiation sources in the territory of Georgia;
- assistance in providing equipment for data collecting and analysis as well as detecting the radiation sources.

The meeting of 3rd working group of Georgian-Abkhaz Coordinating Council which concerns the issue of nuclear materials located in the base of Sukhumi Physical-Technical Institute will be held in the nearest future. This solutions taken on previous meeting has not been yet implemented. Georgian side is ready to

conduct the training for Abkhaz specialists, to give the searching equipment and to send this equipment machine to Abkhaz territory for two weeks. Consequently the precise register of nuclear materials located on the territory of Abkhazia will be conducted.

Respectfully,

(*Signed*) Jemal **Gakhokidze**
Chairman of the Interagency National
Counter-Terrorism Commission,
Deputy Secretary of National Security Council of Georgia,
Candidate of Legal Sciences